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There are a number of key processes involved in creative thought, giving rise to the 
potential for errors to occur. Error management training has been shown to be more 
effective than error avoidance, suggesting the need for research on error management in 
creative problem-solving. In the present effort, we examined the impact of forecasting 
timeframe, forecasting extensiveness, and deliberation on errors on creative problem-
solving. This study asked 225 undergraduate participants to work through six scenarios, 
identify errors in those scenarios, and forecast and/or deliberate on those errors prior to 
completing a final marketing plan appraised for creativity. It was found the number of 
errors identified, number of positive and negative outcomes listed, specificity of forecasts 
and deliberations, and quality of forecasts and deliberations led to better creative 
solutions. The implications of these findings for understanding how people work with 
errors, specifically in creative problem-solving, are discussed. 




Creative achievement is critical to the longevity and success of firms (Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1997; Florida, 2002). Such achievement, however, calls for the production 
of new viable ideas (Mumford, Connelly, Scott, Espejo, Sohl, Hunter, & Bedell, 2005). 
The generation of these new ideas requires creative thought, or the production of original, 
high quality, and elegant solutions (Besemer and O’Quinn, 1999; Christiaans, 2002) in 
response to complex, novel, and ill-defined problems (Mumford & Gustafson, 2007). 
Given the complexities inherent to creative thinking, and the number of processes which 
go into developing a creative solution (Mumford, Mobley, Reiter-Palmon, Uhlman, & 
Doares, 1991), errors are likely to occur.  
There is some evidence, based on the careers of creative people, that errors occur 
throughout the creative process (Pray, 2008; Kanigel, 2005). Findings by Martin, Elliott, 
and Mumford (2019), a study similar to the present effort, show how taking the time to 
think deeply about errors, or deliberate on errors, improves the originality of creative 
problem solutions. Still, more research is needed on the impact errors have on creative 
thought (Hammond, Farr, & Sherman, 2011). Given that forecasting, or the mental 
stimulation of future outcomes of ideas (Mumford, Lonergan, & Scott, 2002), prompts an 
individual to think ahead and consider multiple consequences to ideas, one might expect 
forecasting about errors to influence their potential impact on the creative thinking 
process.  
Specifically, the extensiveness of forecasting and timeframe of forecasts have 
been shown to be positively related to the quality, originality, and elegance of creative 
solutions (Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010; Mumford, Schultz, & VanDoorn, 2001; 
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Lubart, 2001; Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 2004). However, little is known about how 
forecasting about errors influences the production of creative problem solutions. The 
purpose of this study is to investigate how forecasting about and deliberating on 
identified errors influences subsequent creative problem solutions. Specifically, this study 
seeks to explore how the extensiveness of forecasts and time frame of forecasts on 
identified errors impacts the quality, originality, and elegance of creative problem 
solutions. Additionally, this study not only seeks to investigate direct effects of 
forecasting and deliberation on creative problem solutions, but also if these effects are 
mediated by the processes in which people work with errors. 
Errors 
 Failure is often defined differently by practitioners and considered to be context 
specific (Pinto & Covin, 1989) in that the factors which determine success or failure of a 
solution are specific to that solution’s implementation process, perceived value, and 
client satisfaction (Pinto & Mantel, 1990). Failure may result from a number of factors 
(e.g., lack of information, miscommunication), but nonetheless is the consequence of an 
error. Errors can manifest in human performance through a variety of ways (Norman, 
1984; Rasmussen, 1983), and are a result of an individual’s action that leads to an 
undesirable gap between expected and actual performance (Zhau & Olivera, 2006). These 
actions may involve movement, habit, omission, recognition, memory, judgement, goal 
setting, mapping, inaccurate execution of a task, or inappropriate application of 
knowledge (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Rizzo, Bagnara, & Visciola, 1987). 
 Given the multitude of reasons that can lead to an error, it seems critical to 
understand how people identify errors in human performance. A study by Allwood 
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(1984) investigated how people identify errors in statistical problem-solving tasks. Think 
aloud protocols were used as people worked through these tasks. Findings show people 
were able to identify errors based on their knowledge of past experiences and recognition 
of undesirable results between expected and actual performance. People were able to 
identify errors through experience or analysis of performance, and better problem 
solutions were provided by those skilled at identifying errors.  
Understanding error identification strategies given certain contextual parameters 
may be particularly important. Another study by Henneman, Gawlinski, Blank, 
Henneman, Jordan, and McKenzie (2010) sought to describe strategies used by critical 
care nurses to identify medical errors, subsequently employing effective patient care and 
safety protocols. Audio taped focus groups of critical care nurses from two community 
hospitals and two university medical centers were collected. Findings show eight key 
strategies for identifying errors within the context of nurse performance: 1) knowing the 
patient, 2) knowing the “players”, 3) knowing the plan of care, 4) surveillance, 5) 
knowing policy/procedure, 6) double-checking, 7) using systematic processes, and 8) 
questioning. Utilizing these strategies, nurses were able to identify medical errors and 
ensure better patient care and safety. Given that errors arise when there is a discrepancy 
between expected and actual performance (Zhau & Olivera, 2006), it may be that 
strategies giving attention to the specific context and meaning of the discrepancy (e.g., 
knowing the patient, knowing the players) may be critical to ensuring effective problem 
solutions.  
Relatedly, Cowan (1986) argues it may not just be the discrepancy that needs 
attention, but deliberation on the error and attempting to correct that error may be critical 
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for better problem solutions. In the nurses study, once an error was identified using one 
of the eight mentioned strategies, different strategies were taken to interrupt and correct 
those errors, resulting in improved patient care and safety. In fact, research shows that not 
only identifying errors is important, but error management is beneficial to performance 
rather than error avoidance (Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005; Keith & Frese, 2005, 
2008). Specifically, error management training transfer is found to be effective in 
contexts presenting novel, or ill-defined tasks (i.e., creative problems) resulting in better 
problem solutions (Keith & Frese, 2008). 
Errors in Creativity 
 Creative problems are novel, complex, and ill-defined (Mumford & Gustafson, 
2007), thus errors are likely to occur during the problem-solving process for various 
reasons, including biases, improper use of strategies (e.g., simplification strategies), and 
inadequate application of creative thinking processes (e.g., idea evaluation) (Mumford, 
Blair, Dailey, Lertiz, & Osburn, 2006; Mumford, et al., 1991). This being said, there is a 
need for more research on how errors manifest in creative problem solving activities. 
Initial evidence on errors in the idea evaluation process of creative thought has been 
provided by Blair and Mumford (2007). In this study, undergraduate students evaluated a 
list of ideas for funding a foundation and selected the ideas they thought were most 
appropriate.  
Findings show people erroneously avoided ideas that were original, risky, and 
time consuming, even if these ideas were more likely to lead to creative problem 
solutions. Further evidence on people discounting original ideas during idea evaluation 
has been provided by Licuanan, Dailey, and Mumford (2007). In this study, however, 
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participants were less likely to erroneously discount original ideas if they were asked to 
actively analyze the idea. Evidence for errors in other key creative thinking processes can 
be found in the literature, particularly for conceptual combination, where participants 
made more errors depending on the framing of the task (Ward, Patterson, & Sifonis, 
2004), and problem definition, where participants made more errors when focused on 
goals rather than constraints and procedures (Mumford, Baughman, Threlfall, Supinski, 
& Costanza, 1996).  
 Given existing evidence that errors occur in creative thought, it is critical to 
understand how people manage errors when working on creative problem-solving tasks. 
Robledo, Hester, Peterson, Barrett, Day, Hougen, and Mumford (2012) conducted a study 
where participants assumed the role of a principal at an experimental high school. They 
were asked to illustrate their mental models for understanding secondary schools, and 
then write plans for leading their school. Prior to illustrating their mental models, they 
were trained on error management strategies while working through four training 
modules including: 1) future consequences (think about errors that might happen in the 
future as a result of earlier error), 2) social consequences (think about how errors might 
effect different stakeholder groups), 3) controllability (think about whether an error 
would be under your control), and 4) criticality (think about how large an effect an error 
might have in attaining your objective). Findings provided from this study show 
participants had more original and more elegant problem solutions, and stronger mental 
models for conceptualizing the task, when they experienced error management training.  
Thus, if people actively think about errors while working on a creative problem, it 
appears they will produce better creative solutions. Further evidence of this can be found 
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in a study similar to the present effort. Martin et. al. (2019) presented undergraduates 
with a series of ten marketing scenarios and ideas. They were subsequently asked to 
identify, deliberate, and/or remediate any errors they saw while evaluating these ideas, 
and then asked to write a marketing plan. It was found the number of errors identified and 
the quality of their suggestions on how to fix those errors were positively correlated with 
the quality, originality, and elegance of their plans. Additionally, those who deliberated 
on, or actively thought about, identified errors had more original problem solutions. 
Taken as a whole, these findings lead to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Identification of errors will be positively related to the production 
of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher quality, and higher elegance. 
Identification of errors is a critical first step in managing them (Allwood, 1984; 
Henneman et. al., 2010) and forecasting their potential consequences, but initial evidence 
also shows people must think deeply about these errors (Martin et. al., 2019). Findings 
from the Martin et. al. (2019) study showed deliberation improved the originality, but 
hurt the elegance of plans. In another study by Marcy and Mumford (2007) 
undergraduates were asked to respond to six social innovation problems drawn from the 
business and educational domains. Participants engaged in causal analysis skill training 
and were asked to engage in deliberation by forecasting the downstream implications of 
their problem solutions and think about the implications of their solutions for 
stakeholders. Findings show causal analysis skills led to the production of more creative 
problem solutions, particularly for those participants asked to deliberate. 
 Deliberation on errors may cause people to consider multiple paths to a problem 
solution, increasing the complexity of problem-solving efforts subsequently hurting the 
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elegance of a creative solution (Martin et. al., 2019). That said, evidence still shows its 
positive impact on the originality of plans. Our second hypothesis states that deliberation 
on errors will lead to more original but less elegant problem solutions. 
Hypothesis 2: Deliberation on identified errors will result in the production of 
creative problem solutions of higher originality, but less elegance. 
Forecasting 
Given that errors will occur throughout the creative thinking process, it is critical 
to identify strategies on managing these errors while working on a creative problem. The 
evidence mentioned thus far suggests identifying and actively thinking about errors will 
influence the production of more creative problem solutions, but more research is needed 
to understand how other processes known to contribute to creative problem-solving may 
play a role in error management. For example, forecasting, a cognitive activity involving 
the projection of downstream consequences of actions or ideas (Mumford et al., 2002), 
has been shown to benefit creative problem solutions (Shipman, Byrne, & Mumford, 
2010; Byrne et. al., 2010; Marta, Leritz, & Mumford, 2005) and may prompt individuals 
to consider downstream consequences of errors they have identified, further influencing 
creative performance. 
 There is evidence that certain factors of forecasting contribute to creative 
performance. Byrne, Shipman, and Mumford (2010) asked undergraduates to assume the 
role of a mid-level manager responsible for writing an advertising campaign that would 
promote a new high-energy root beer. They received emails asking them to forecast the 
implications of their ideas, and the effects of their plan for implementing their ideas. 
Plans were evaluated for quality, originality, and elegance, and forecasts were evaluated 
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for 27 attributes, with extensiveness of the forecast as an emerging factor. Findings show 
more extensive forecasts led to plans of higher quality, originality, and elegance. The 
extensiveness of forecasts reflects a more detailed, comprehensive understanding of the 
problem and potential issues that may arise in problem-solving efforts. Thus, it may be 
that forecasting about errors in creative thinking may prompt people to consider a more 
comprehensive understanding of the consequences of those identified errors, and 
subsequently influence creative problem solutions. This notion leads to our third 
hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3: Forecasting extensiveness on identified errors will result in the 
production of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher quality, and higher 
elegance. 
In a similar study, Shipman, Byrne, and Mumford (2010) asked undergraduates to 
assume the role of a principal in an experimental secondary school. They were asked to 
write a plan for leading this school while receiving emails asking participants to forecast 
outcomes of their plans. Plans were appraised for quality, originality, and elegance, and 
forecasts were appraised for 21 forecasting attributes, of which both forecasting 
extensiveness and forecasting time frame were emerging factors. Findings are consistent 
with Byrne et. al. (2010) in that extensiveness of forecasts led to plans of higher quality, 
originality, and elegance. Additionally, findings show forecasting over a long time frame, 
as opposed to a short time frame, led to plans of higher quality, originality, and elegance. 
It may be that considering consequences further downstream, as opposed to just 
imminent consequences, may prompt people to consider long-lasting effects of errors 
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made, thus influencing creative performance. These findings lead to our fourth 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Forecasting over a long time frame on identified errors will result 
in the production of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher quality, and 
higher elegance.  
Working with Errors 
 Thus far, evidence has been provided to suggest not only identifying and 
deliberating on errors (Martin et al., 2019, Keith & Frese, 2005), but potentially 
forecasting about errors (Shipman et al., 2010; Byrne et al., 2010) may directly influence 
the quality, originality, and elegance of creative problem solutions. Of note, however, is 
the question if the effects on quality, originality, and elegance are direct, or mediated by 
the processes by which people work with those errors. In other words, are the ways in 
which people work with errors in their forecasts and deliberations mediating their effects 
on creative performance?  
In Byrne et al. (2010), a factor that improved the quality, originality, and elegance 
of advertising campaigns was the forecasting of negative outcomes. In other words, when 
forecasting, participants who identified more negative outcomes produced better creative 
solutions. Additionally, Osburn and Mumford (2006) found that when participants were 
trained to forecast about negative outcomes, contingencies and restrictions, and long-term 
outcomes, creative performance improved. It may be that when people work with errors 
by specifically considering negative outcomes, they produce plans of higher quality, 
originality, and elegance.  
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 Hypothesis 5: Considering more negative outcomes when working with errors 
will result in the production of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher 
quality, and higher elegance. 
Relatedly, considering positive outcomes has been shown to improve strategies 
that influence creative problem solving (Mulhearn, McIntosh, & Mumford, 2020). 
Mulhearn et al. (2020) asked participants to assume the role of a manager of a clothing 
company trying to enter a new market. Prior to formulating plans on expanding this 
company into a new market, participants were asked to analyze cases, make an outline of 
their plan, and forecast the implications of their plan. It was found that generation of 
positive outcomes improved forecasting, which subsequently improve the quality, 
originality, and elegance of problem solutions. Thus, it may be that when people consider 
more positive outcomes in working with errors, they will subsequently produce better 
creative solutions. 
Hypothesis 6: Considering more positive outcomes when working with errors will 
result in the production of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher 
quality, and higher elegance. 
Additionally, the specificity or generality by which people work with errors may 
influence creative problem solutions. Ward et al. (2004) manipulated instructions of a 
task priming participants to think more abstractly or more specifically while generating 
ideas. It was found that specificity hurt the novelty of problem solutions in that it 
constrained the formation of a new idea compared to those who thought more abstractly. 
That said, it is argued that greater specificity of information when engaging in strategies 
used to improve creative problem-solving (i.e., propulsion strategies) (Mecca & 
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Mumford, 2014), could expedite the problem-solving process and thus improve 
subsequent creative problem solutions (Ward et al., 2004). It may be that being more 
specific when engaging in error management strategies, by working with and thinking 
about errors in greater detail, will lead to higher quality, more original, and more elegant 
problem solutions. 
Hypothesis 7: Greater specificity when working with errors will result in the 
production of creative problem solutions of higher originality, higher quality, and higher 
elegance. 
 Finally, it may be that when people are more complete and coherent when 
working with errors, considering more appropriate ways to address those errors, they may 
produce better creative problem solutions. When deliberating on errors, people may 
consider multiple paths to a problem solution. Likewise, when forecasting about errors, 
people are likely to consider multiple downstream consequences of those errors. 
Considering more complete, coherent, and useful paths and consequences when working 
with identified errors may influence creative performance. Thus, when engaging in error 
management strategies, people who provide higher quality responses, or who are more 
through when working with those errors may subsequently produce better creative 
solutions. 
Hypothesis 8: Participants who produce higher quality responses when working 
with errors will result in the production of creative problem solutions of higher 




  The participants in this study included 225 undergraduates from a large 
southwestern university. Participants were recruited via an online recruiting platform and 
received extra credit for participating. They were provided a brief description of the 
studies available online and selected the study in which they wanted to participate. There 
were 35.1% males and 64.9% females, with an average age of 18.81 years and an average 
GPA of 3.58. Academic ability for these participants lay a quarter standard deviation 
above freshmen enrolling at four-year institutions. 
General Procedures 
This two-hour study is similar to the one conducted in Martin, et. al. (2019), with 
a few changes, including the administration of this study being completely online via 
Qualtrics. Participants were asked to participate in a study where they would engage in 
problem-solving at a fictious marketing firm. The first twenty minutes involved a set of 
timed covariate controls. The remainder of this study allowed participants to work at their 
own pace completing an experimental task and a series of untimed covariate measures. 
The experimental task took about seventy minutes to complete, and the untimed covariate 
measures took half an hour. Upon completion of the study, participants were presented a 
debriefing form and awarded credit. 
The experimental task was adapted from Gibson and Mumford (2013). 
Participants were presented with a novel, complex, ill-defined creative problem-solving 
task and asked to assume the role of a mid-level manager at a specialty apparel firm.  
They were presented with a description of the firm, including the company’s history, and 
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told their task is to review a series of marketing scenarios and develop a marketing 
campaign to help expand the firm into the southern market. Participants were also 
presented with marketing research about the firm, including information about their 
customers, competitors, their brand recognition, the location of the company, and 
information on other companies their customers like to shop. Next, they were presented 
with an email from the senior vice president instructing them to review a series of six 
marketing scenarios accompanied by ideas submitted from other marketing managers. 
Participants reviewed the ideas and responded to a series of questions presented with 
each scenario. Each scenario asked participants to provide a one or two sentence 
summary of the scenario and identify errors in the other manager’s ideas. They were then 
presented with a second email from the senior vice president and asked to reflect on the 
errors they identified before writing a final marketing campaign to expand the specialty 
apparel firm into the southern market. Judges appraised these plans for quality, 
originality, and elegance (Besemer & O’Quin, 1999; Christiaans, 2002). 
Participants were asked to summarize each scenario in one or two sentences and 
identify any errors in the ideas submitted by other marketing managers. Participants were 
then asked additional probe questions, depending on their randomly assigned condition, 
asking them to forecast any short-term or long-term outcomes the errors may cause, to 
forecast any and all possible situations and outcomes that may occur from the errors, 
and/or to deliberate, or think more deeply about one of the errors they identified and write 
a paragraph describing how they would manage that error. Half of the scenarios presented 
had errors embedded in them, half did not have embedded errors. These errors were 
drawn from prior research on marketing errors by Korte (2003), and the scenarios 
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alternated from one with embedded errors to one without. Written answers to these 
questions were appraised by trained judges to evaluate their performance on the 
identification of errors, deliberation on those identified errors, the timeframe of forecasts, 
and the extensiveness of forecasts. 
Control Measures 
 The set of timed covariate control measures involved measures of intelligence and 
divergent thinking. The intelligence test was the verbal reasoning measure drawn from 
the Employee Aptitude Survey. This measure included 30 items and presented a set of 
facts bearing on a problem, asking participants to indicate “true”, “false”, or “uncertain”. 
This measure produces retest reliabilities above .80. Evidence for this test as a measure of 
intelligence has been shown by Grimsley, Ruch, Warren, and Ford (1985) and Ruch and 
Ruch (1980). Divergent thinking was assessed using Merrifield, Guilford, Christensen, 
and Frick’s (1962) consequences measure. Participants were presented with five 
questions about unlikely scenarios (e.g., What would be the consequences if people no 
longer wanted or needed to sleep?) and asked to list as many consequences as they 
possibly can under a ten-minute time limit. The measure is scored for fluency (i.e., the 
number of consequences listed) and yields internal consistency coefficients above .70. 
Merrifield et al. (1962) and Vincent, Decker, and Mumford (2002) provide validity 
evidence for the use of this measure.  
 The set of untimed covariate controls involved a measure of demographics, 
marketing expertise, a task-specific knowledge test, and measures of planning skills, need 
for cognition, and personality. The marketing expertise measure was drawn from Gibson 
and Mumford (2013). This measure presents background information questions 
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(Mumford & Owens, 1987) inquiring about past involvement in marketing activities. 
Questions include “How often have you discussed current advertisements with your 
friends” and “How often have you thought about how you could make advertisements 
better”. Participants responded on a self-report, 5-point scale indicating how often they 
engaged in that activity. Internal consistency coefficients for this measure are about .70. 
Gibson and Mumford (2013) provide validity evidence for this measure of marketing 
expertise. The task-specific knowledge test was used to assess participant’s knowledge of 
the firm and asked them five questions including “What type of merchandise does 
Charamousse sell” and “Where are Charamousse’s operations primarily based”. Internal 
consistency coefficients for this measure are above .70. Given that the questions were 
written for this specific task, evidence is provided for the content validity of this measure. 
 Planning skill was measured using Marta, Lertiz, and Mumford’s (2005) measure 
of planning skills. Participants are presented with business scenarios and asked to 
respond to five questions assessing key planning skills (e.g., identification of downstream 
consequences). Each question presented a list of 6 to 12 potential responses, and asked 
participants to select 3 to 4 as their answers. These responses were scored for application 
of relevant planning skills in response to the scenario. Split-half reliability coefficients 
are in the .80s, and Marta, Leritz, and Mumford (2005) provide evidence for the construct 
and predictive validity of this measure.  
 Given that the experimental task was novel, complex, and ill-defined, it required 
participants to invest some degree of cognitive resources. Thus, participants were asked 
to complete Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) need for cognition scale where they responded 
to a series of 18-items assessing engagement in cognitive actives. Example items include 
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“I prefer complex to simple problems” and “I prefer my life to be filled with problems I 
must solve”.  Using a 5-point scale, participants indicate to what degree they agree or 
disagree with these statements. Internal consistency coefficients for this scale are about 
.80, with evidence for predictive validity provided by Marcy and Mumford (2007) and 
Osburn and Mumford (2006). The final untimed covariate measure was an assessment of 
personality using Costa and McCrae’s (1989) NEO Five Factor inventory measure of 
openness, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and extraversion. This measure 
presents a series of 60 items including “I am not a worrier” and “I like to have a lot of 
people around me” and asked participants to respond on a 5-point scale how much they 
agree or disagree with those statements.  
Experimental Task 
 The experimental task in this study asked participants to assume the role of a mid-
level marketing manager at a specialty apparel firm called Charamousse. Participants 
were first presented with general instructions stating they need to read through 
information on the company’s background, customer base, and work environment, 
proceed to review a series of six scenarios accompanied by ideas submitted by other 
marketing managers, and finally write a campaign to expand the firm into the southern 
market. After these instructions, participants went on to read about the history of the firm. 
This paragraph informed participants that the firm had been founded in 1998 with the 
purpose of selling original clothing using sustainable production practices. Each shirt was 
original in that only a certain number of each product was produced and sold in stores, 
thus ensuring customers had a unique product. Participants were told that Charamousse 
had 14 stores across the Midwest located in renovated spaces. The firm owner, 
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Montogmery Foster, saw that the firm’s growth had stopped in 2019 and sought to 
expand its operations into a new, southern market. At this point the participant is told it is 
their job to help in this process by reviewing marketing ideas and create a final campaign 
to expand into the new market. 
 Participants are then presented with a page of marketing research for the firm. 
This marketing research included information about the customers, competitors, and the 
company’s environment. Participants were told customers on average were extroverted 
young adults who spend a lot of money on clothes. The firm’s brand is recognized in the 
Midwest, but not the south. Competitors were primarily high-end designer clothing firms. 
Charamousse’s customers tended to be college graduates earning about $60,000 a year 
and enjoyed yoga. Firms similar to Charamousse include Apple, drinks made by 
Odwalla, and hybrid cars. This market research summary can be seen in Figure one.  
_______________ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
_______________ 
Participants then proceeded to the next page where they received an email from 
the senior vice president, Colleen Anderson, requesting that they review a series of six 
marketing scenarios with ideas submitted by other managers. Participants were instructed 
to “identify any solution-related errors you see in the proposed marketing ideas”. 
Depending on their randomly assigned condition, participants were also asked to 
“describe the short-term/long-term outcomes of those errors”, “describe any other 
potential outcomes that may result from those errors”, and “elaborate on how you would 
manage those errors”. Participants were reminded they will be responsible for writing a 
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final marketing campaign to help Charamousse enter the southern market, and then 
proceeded to an attachment from this email providing an overview of errors. This 
overview provided a definition of what an error was and might look like in the following 
scenarios. This attachment can be seen in Figure two.   
_______________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
_______________ 
Next, participants were presented with six marketing scenarios accompanied by 
ideas submitted by other marketing managers. Scenarios were presented in a fixed order 
across all conditions, and participants were asked to provide a one to two sentence 
summary of each scenario. Each scenario was about three to four sentences long and 
contained three ideas, each a sentence long, for how to take action in that scenario. 
Scenarios could be a team’s sales resulted in employee prizes, or a special event was 
planned and ideas were needed to attract both new and old customers. Three scenarios 
had embedded errors, three did not, and scenarios alternated between having errors and 
not having errors. Errors were based on prior marketing research by Korte (2003) 
including: 1) missing important causes, 2) unrealistic expectations of success, 3) failing 
to recognize complex interdependencies, 4) overlooking important alternatives, 5) 
selective information gathering, and 6) subjective information processing. A scenario 
with embedded errors is provided in Figure three. 
_______________ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
_______________ 
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After reviewing these marketing scenarios, participants received a second email 
from Colleen Anderson and were instructed to begin the final marketing campaign to 
help Charamousse enter the southern market. Participants moved on from this email to 
answer the final prompt which stated “Take a moment to reflect on the errors you 
identified and their outcomes. Please create a final marketing campaign to help us enter 
the southern market.” 
Design and Manipulation 
 This was a 2x2x2 study design. Manipulations included probe questions for 
forecasting timeframe, forecasting extensiveness, and deliberation, and were presented in 
this fixed order depending on condition, respectively. In the control condition, 
participants were just asked to provide a one to two sentence summary of the scenario 
they read, and were asked to identify any solution-related errors they saw while reading 
through the ideas (“please list the errors you identified in the scenario in the space 
below”). In all other conditions, participants were then asked additional questions asking 
them to forecast about the outcomes of those errors, or deliberate more on an error they 
identified. In the forecasting timeframe condition, participants were asked to either 
“Please consider the errors you identified in the above scenario and list the short-term 
outcomes these errors may cause” or “Please consider the errors you identified in the 
above scenario and list the long-term outcomes these errors may cause”. In the 
forecasting extensiveness condition, participants were asked to “Please consider the 
errors you identified in the above scenario and write a paragraph about possible outcomes 
that may occur. Please consider any and all possible situations and outcomes that may 
occur from the errors”. In the deliberation condition, participants were asked to “Please 
 20 
think more about one of the errors you identified and write a paragraph describing how 
you would manage this error”.  
Dependent Variables 
 After reviewing the six scenarios presenting various marketing ideas, participants 
then moved on to the final task asking them to reflect on identified errors and write a 
final marketing plan to help the firm enter a new market. These plans were appraised by 
trained judges for key attributes of creative problem solutions, quality, originality, and 
elegance, according to Besemer and O’Quin (1999) and Christiaans (2002). Benchmark 
rating scales were used to appraise these plans given their use provides greater reliability 
and accuracy of evaluating creative products (Redmond, Mumford, and Teach, 1993). 
Quality was defined as a complete, coherent, and workable solution. Originality was 
defined as an unexpected well-elaborated solution. Elegance was defined as a refined 
clever solution where solution elements fit together seamlessly. Judges rated a set of 
sample marketing plans for these three variables. Based on these sample ratings, plans 
were identified that represented low, mid, and high points of each scale with little to no 
disagreement across judges. These were then used to provide scale anchors. An example 
rating scale is provided in Figure four.  
_______________ 
Insert Figure 4 here 
_______________ 
 Three doctoral students were the judges asked to appraise marketing plans using 
these rating scales. These students were familiar with both the marketing and creativity 
literature domains. Judges first met for an hour-long frame of reference training session 
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where they got familiar with the experimental task and operational definitions of 
variables needing to be applied to the plans. Judges then rated a set of marketing plans, 
and met again to discuss differences in their evaluation of marketing plans. During these 
consensus meetings, judges clarified procedures for applying their ratings to these plans 
in terms of quality, originality, and elegance. Training was effective in that interrater 
agreement coefficients were .82, .79, and .76 for evaluating quality, originality, and 
elegance after meeting to clarify rating procedures.  
 These judges also appraised written responses from the six marketing scenarios 
with respect to errors. Specifically, judges were asked to count the number of errors 
identified, and the number of positive and negative outcomes listed in their forecasts and 
deliberations of errors. They were also asked to rate the quality and specificity of their 
forecasts and deliberations of errors. Specificity was defined as the degree to which 
responses address larger problems vs. specific issues. Quality was defined as a complete, 
coherent, and useful response when working with an error. Interrater agreement 
coefficients were .86 and .85 for specificity and quality, respectively. Intraclass 
correlation coefficients are provided for the number of errors identified, the number of 
positive outcomes, and number of negative outcomes as .99, .91, and .97 respectively.  
Analyses 
 The first set of analyses looked at correlations between our creativity dependent 
variables, quality, originality, and elegance, with our covariates and rated error variables 
(e.g., number of errors identified, number of positive and negative outcomes, specificity 
of response, quality of response). In the second set of analyses, analysis of covariance 
tests were conducted to observe direct effects of our manipulations on quality, originality, 
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and elegance. Covariates were included in the ANCOVAs if they were significant at the 
.10 level. The third set of analyses included another set of analysis of covariance tests 
looking at how our manipulations influenced the quality, originality, and elegance of 
plans. A median split was then conducted on these scenario variables in order to conduct 
a fourth set of analyses, another series of analysis of covariance tests looking at these 
variables on quality, originality, and elegance. Our analyses took an approach similar to 
Marta et al. (2005), looking at how the number of identified errors, number of positive 
and negative outcomes, and the quality and specificity of responses while working with 
errors mediated the effects of our manipulations on the quality, originality, and elegance 
of plans.  
Results 
 Table 1 displays correlations for quality, originality, and elegance with our 
covariates. All three are strongly correlated with intelligence, divergent thinking, and the 
knowledge test. Table 2 presents correlations for quality, originality, and elegance on our 
rated scenario variables. As can be seen, the number of errors identified was positively 
correlated with quality (r = .44), originality (r = .36), and elegance (r = .42). The number 
of positive outcomes listed was positively correlated with quality (r = .24), originality (r 
= .23), and elegance (r = .23). The number of negative outcomes listed was positively 
correlated with quality (r = .30), originality (r = .25), and elegance (r = .30). Specificity 
was positively correlated with quality (r = .52), originality (r = .42), and elegance (r = 
.50). Finally, quality of scenario responses was positively correlated with quality (r = 




Insert Table 1 here 
_______________ 
_______________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
_______________ 
 Table 3 displays ANCOVA results for our manipulations on quality, originality, 
and elegance. For quality, the knowledge test (F (1, 214) = 11.60, p ≤ 0.01) and 
intelligence (F (1, 214) = 15.68, p ≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. No significant 
effects from our manipulations were found for plan quality. When looking at originality, 
knowledge test (F (1, 214) = 10.62, p ≤ 0.01) and divergent thinking (F (1, 214) = 7.66, p 
≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. No manipulation effects were found on plan 
originality. For elegance, knowledge test (F (1, 214) = 13.12, p ≤ 0.01) and intelligence 
(F (1, 214) = 10.29, p ≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. As with quality and originality, 
no manipulation effects were found for plan elegance. 
_______________ 
Insert Table 3 here 
_______________ 
Table 4 displays ANCOVA results for our manipulations on our rated scenario 
variables. For number of errors identified, knowledge test (F (1, 213) = 8.12, p ≤ 0.01), 
divergent thinking (F (1, 213) = 12.06, p ≤ 0.01), and openness (F (1, 213) = 4.63, p ≤ 
0.05) were significant covariates. No effects from our manipulations were found on the 
number of errors identified. For number of positive outcomes, main effects were found 
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for the deliberation manipulation (F (1, 191) = 48.21, p ≤ 0.01), and an interaction effect 
was found with deliberation and extensiveness (F (1, 191) = 21.37, p ≤ 0.01). When 
participants were instructed to deliberate on the errors they identified, they listed more 
positive outcomes (M = .41, SD = .02) than those not asked to deliberate (M = .18, SD = 
.02). And, for deliberation and forecasting extensiveness, participants listed more positive 
outcomes (M = .48, SD = .03) when asked to deliberate but not forecast extensively, 
compared to those in neither condition (M = .09, SD = .03), those asked just to forecast 
extensively (M = .26, SD = .03), and those asked to do both (M = .34, SD = .03). Still, 
those asked to deliberate and forecast extensively had more positive outcomes listed than 
those asked just to forecast or those in neither condition.  
For the number of negative outcomes listed, divergent thinking was a significant 
covariate (F (1, 191) = 12.20, p ≤ 0.01). Main effects for deliberation (F (1, 191) = 49.16, 
p ≤ 0.01) and extensiveness (F (1, 191) = 9.29, p ≤ 0.01) were found. Those asked to 
deliberate produced less negative outcomes (M = .95, SD = .06) than those not asked (M 
= 1.52, SD = .06). Those asked to forecast extensively produced more negative outcomes 
(M = 1.36, SD = .06) than those not asked (M = 1.11, SD = .06). 
For specificity, knowledge test (F (1, 190) = 15.71, p ≤ 0.01) and divergent 
thinking (F (1, 190) = 6.94, p ≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. Main effects for 
timeframe (F (1, 190) = 4.84, p ≤ 0.05) and extensiveness (F (1, 190) = 4.04, p ≤ 0.05) 
were found. When participants were asked to consider more short term outcomes, they 
were less specific (M = 2.27, SD = .06) compared to those asked to consider long term 
outcomes (M = 2.44, SD = .06). When participants were asked to forecast extensively, 
they were more specific (M = 2.44, SD = .06) compared to those not asked (M = 2.27, SD 
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= .06). Additionally an interaction between deliberation and extensiveness (F (1, 190) = 
4.80, p ≤ 0.05) was found. Those asked to deliberate but not forecast extensively were 
more specific (M = 2.40, SD = .08) than those not asked to forecast or deliberate (M = 
2.15,  SD = .08). When asked to forecast extensively and deliberate, participants were 
less specific (M = 2.38, SD = .08) than when asked to forecast but not deliberate (M = 
2.49, SD = .08). 
For quality, knowledge test (F (1, 190) = 21.38, p ≤ 0.01) and divergent thinking 
(F (1, 190) = 6.96, p ≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. Main effects for timeframe (F (1, 
190) = 3.80, p ≤ 0.05) and extensiveness (F (1, 190) = 4.63, p ≤ 0.05) were found. Those 
asked to forecast short term produced less quality responses (M = 2.18, SD = .06) 
compared to those asked to forecast long term (M = 2.33, SD = .06). Those asked to 
forecast extensively produced higher quality (M = 2.34, SD = .06) response compared to 
those not asked (M = 2.17, SD = .06). Additionally, an interaction between extensiveness 
and deliberation was found (F (1, 190) = 4.41, p ≤ 0.05). Those asked to forecast 
extensively and deliberate on errors produced less quality response (M = 2.28, SD = .08) 
compared to those asked to forecast extensively but not deliberate (M = 2.41, SD = .08). 
Those asked to deliberate but not forecast extensively produced higher quality responses 
(M = 2.27, SD = .08) compared to those not asked to forecast or deliberate (M = 2.07, SD 
= .08).  
_______________ 
Insert Table 4 here 
_______________ 
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 Table 5 displays ANCOVA results for our scenarios rated variables on quality, 
originality, and elegance. Median splits were conducted on number of errors identified, 
number of positive outcomes, number of negative outcomes, specificity, and quality. For 
quality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 4.12, p ≤ 0.05) and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 13.84, 
p ≤ 0.01) were significant covariates. A main effect (F (1, 196) = 13.73, p ≤ 0.01) was 
found for number of errors identified in that when more errors were identified, higher 
quality plans (M = 2.75, SD = .08) were produced compared to when fewer errors were 
identified (M = 2.33, SD = .08). Similar results were found for originality in that there 
was a significant main effect (F (1, 196) = 6.33, p ≤ 0.05) where those who identified 
more errors produced more original plans (M = 2.09, SD = .07) than those who identified 
fewer error (M = 1.83, SD = .07). Knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 6.83, p ≤ 0.05) and 
divergent thinking (F (1, 196) = 4.21, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. For elegance, 
knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 5.24, p ≤ 0.05) and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 10.42, p ≤ 
0.01) were significant covariates. A main effect was found for the number of errors 
identified (F (1, 196) = 12.18, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who identified more produced more 
elegant plans (M = 2.81, SD = .07) than those who identified less errors (M = 2.43, SD = 
.08). 
 When looking at number of positive outcomes on quality, knowledge test (F (1, 
196) = 7.77, p ≤ 0.05) and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 14.38, p ≤ 0.05) were significant 
covariates. There was a main effect (F (1, 196) = 5.04, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who 
identified more positive outcomes had higher quality plans (M = 2.68, SD = .08) 
compared to those who identified fewer positive outcomes (M = 2.43, SD = .08). For 
originality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 9.71, p ≤ 0.05) and divergent thinking (F (1, 
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196) = 6.53, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect for number of positive 
outcomes was found (F (1, 196) = 4.46, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who identified more 
produced more original plans (M = 2.07, SD = .07) compared to those who identified 
fewer positive outcomes (M = 1.87, SD = .07). For elegance, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 
9.06, p ≤ 0.05) and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 10.97, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. 
A main effect was found (F (1, 196) = 5.45, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who identified more 
positive outcomes produced more elegant solutions (M = 2.75, SD = .08) compared to 
those who identified fewer positive outcomes (M = 2.50, SD = .08).  
 For negative outcomes on quality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 6.53, p ≤ 0.05) 
and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 12.34, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect 
was found (F (1, 196) = 9.54, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who listed more negative outcomes 
had higher quality plans (M = 2.72, SD = .08) compared to those who listed fewer (M = 
2.37, SD = .08). For originality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 7.94, p ≤ 0.05) and 
divergent thinking (F (1, 196) = 6.33, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect 
(F (1, 196) = 6.96, p ≤ 0.05) was found in that those who listed more negative outcomes 
had more original plans (M = 2.10, SD = .07) compared to those who listed fewer (M = 
1.84, SD = .07). For elegance, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 7.66, p ≤ 0.05) and 
intelligence (F (1, 196) = 9.11, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect was 
found (F (1, 196) = 10.72, p ≤ 0.05) and shows those who listed more negative outcomes 
had more elegant plans (M = 2.80, SD = .08) compared to those who listed fewer negative 
outcomes (M = 2.45, SD = .08). 
 For specificity on quality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 5.66, p ≤ 0.05) and 
intelligence (F (1, 196) = 12.09, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A significant main 
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effect was found (F (1, 196) = 18.37, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who were more specific had 
higher quality plans (M = 2.78, SD = .08) compared to those who were not as specific (M 
= 2.31, SD = .08). For originality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 7.70, p ≤ 0.05) and 
divergent thinking (F (1, 196) = 5.21, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect 
was found (F (1, 196) = 8.09, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who were more specific provided 
mor original plans (M = 2.10, SD = .07) compared to those who were less specific (M = 
1.82, SD = .07). For elegance, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 7.00, p ≤ 0.05) and 
intelligence (F (1, 196) = 9.03, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect (F (1, 
196) = 14.19, p ≤ 0.05) was found in that those who were more specific provided more 
elegant plans (M = 2.82, SD = .07) compared to those less specific (M = 2.42, SD = .08). 
 Finally, for quality of working with errors on plan quality, knowledge test (F (1, 
196) = 4.21, p ≤ 0.05) and intelligence (F (1, 196) = 12.00, p ≤ 0.05) were significant 
covariates. A significant main effect was found (F (1, 196) = 22.78, p ≤ 0.05) in that 
those who wrote better quality responses provided higher quality plans (M = 2.81, SD = 
.08) compared to those who provided less quality responses (M = 2.28, SD = .08). For 
originality, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 5.85, p ≤ 0.05) and divergent thinking (F (1, 
196) = 4.82, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect was found (F (1, 196) = 
14.95, p ≤ 0.05) in that those who wrote better quality responses provided more original 
plans (M = 2.16, SD = .07) compared to those who provided less quality responses (M = 
1.77, SD = .07). And, for elegance, knowledge test (F (1, 196) = 5.26, p ≤ 0.05) and 
intelligence (F (1, 196) = 8.81, p ≤ 0.05) were significant covariates. A main effect (F (1, 
196) = 21.71, p ≤ 0.05) was found in that those who wrote better quality responses 
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provided more elegant plans (M = 2.81, SD = .07) compared to those who provided less 
quality responses (M = 2.38, SD = .08). 
_______________ 
Insert Table 5 here 
_______________ 
Discussion 
 Limitations should be addressed before turning to the findings and implications of 
this study. First, this study was based on an experimental paradigm with undergraduate 
students, thus the generalizability of results to real world settings is questionable. Error 
management strategies employed by undergraduates in a lab setting may be different than 
strategies employed in the real world, particularly by those with more marketing 
expertise. And, it may be that undergraduates are not as good at identifying errors in 
marketing scenarios as those with more marketing expertise. It should be noted that our 
knowledge test was a significant covariate in most analyses, thus it is likely that expertise 
accounts for differences in performance not only in error management, but error 
management in creative problem-solving. This knowledge test was a task specific 
measure, not a general knowledge measure. 
Second, participants were instructed to identify errors prior to responding to our 
manipulations – consider short-term or long-term outcomes of those errors (e.g., 
forecasting timeframe), consider any and all possible consequences of those errors (e.g., 
forecasting extensiveness), and deliberate on those errors. In other words, forecasting and 
deliberations were with respect to errors identified from marketing scenarios prior to 
moving on to the final task. Thus, results from this study are valuable with respect to 
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errors, or how people work with errors, and not necessarily on creative problem-solving 
in general (Lonergan et al., 2004).  
Third, manipulations were presented in a fixed order. Participants identified 
errors, and were then presented with forecasting timeframe, forecasting extensiveness, 
and deliberation manipulation prompts, respectively. Findings could be different if 
manipulations were presented in a different order. For example, if participants were asked 
to deliberate on errors they identified prior to forecasting about their consequences, 
forecasts might consider more or different consequences and thus influence subsequent 
creative problem solutions.  
Fourth, this study was based on a low fidelity marketing exercise (Motowidlo, 
Dunnette, & Carter, 1990). It is worth noting that there is prior evidence provided by 
Gibson and Mumford (2013) that this clothing exercise is appropriate for studying 
creative problem-solving in lab settings. Still, it is a low-fidelity simulation and 
maximizing real-world creative problem solving may produce different findings. Fifth, 
the body of research on error management in creative problem-solving is limited. Even 
considering initial evidence on this topic (Martin et al., 2019; Robledo et al., 2012; 
Licuanan et al., 2007), much more research is needed to understand how people work 
with errors while engaging in creative problem-solving efforts. The present effort 
attempts to add to the literature in exploring how people work with errors through 
forecasting and deliberating on identified errors in a marketing task. 
 Of note are differences between the Martin et al. (2019) study and the present 
effort. Rather than ten scenarios, only six were used. This was meant to lessen the 
cognitive burden on participants as they identified, forecasted, and deliberated on errors 
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for each scenario. Additionally, the scenarios with embedded errors were alternated with 
scenarios without embedded errors – the Martin et al. (2019) study presented scenarios 
with errors as the first set of five scenarios, and without errors as the last set of five 
scenarios. Alternating scenarios with errors embedded and not embedded should help 
control for potential bias and extraneous factors as participants worked through the 
experimental task. Finally, the present effort was conducted completely online via 
Qualtrics rather than a lab setting – a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings may 
differ from that of Martin et al. (2019) given participants completed the task in their own 
setting and on their own personal devices.  
 Bearing these limitations in mind, the present study has some noteworthy 
implications, particularly with regard to how people work with errors on a creative 
problem-solving task. Our first hypothesis was supported in that the number of errors 
identified would be positively related to the quality, originality, and elegance of plans. 
When people are instructed to identify errors prior to engaging in a creative task, they 
eliminate non-viable solution paths that may otherwise be considered, and thus produce 
plans of higher quality, originality, and elegance (Martin et al., 2019).  
 Turning to our manipulations, it can be seen that our second, third, and fourth 
hypotheses are not supported in that there are no direct effects on the quality, originality, 
and elegance of plans. Of note, however, is the effects of our knowledge test and 
intelligence on the quality and elegance of plans, along with the effects seen from our 
knowledge test and divergent thinking on the originality of plans. Specifically, 
forecasting timeframe, forecasting extensiveness, and deliberation had no impact on the 
quality, originality, and elegance of marketing plans when considering intelligence, 
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divergent thinking, and task expertise. People can think about short term or long term 
outcomes of errors, consider any and all possible outcomes of errors, and thinking deeply 
on errors, but this does not appear to influence creative performance when intelligence, 
divergent thinking, and knowledge are considered. Of particular note is the knowledge 
test, which had an effect on all three aspects of our creativity variables – quality, 
originality, and elegance. It appears task expertise is particularly important when working 
with errors and influences subsequent creative problem solutions.  
 Although our manipulations didn’t work directly on the creativity of our plans, 
results show that our manipulations did in fact have effects on the number of positive 
outcomes listed, the number of negative outcomes listed, the specificity of forecasts and 
deliberations on errors, and the quality of forecasts and deliberations on errors. But, first, 
although the number of errors identified was not seen to be directly impacted by our 
manipulations, it is of note that participants were asked to identify errors prior to 
responding to our manipulation prompts – thus, errors had to be identified before they 
could be forecasted or deliberated on by participants. And, as stated previously, along 
with initial evidence provided in the literature (Martin et al., 2019), the number of errors 
identified on is positively related to the quality, originality, and elegance of plans, 
suggesting the identification of more errors is beneficial to the production of more 
creative problem solutions.  
 With this in mind, it is of note that people identified more positive outcomes 
when asked to deliberate on errors identified. Additionally, when people were asked to 
both forecast extensively about errors and deliberate on errors, more positive outcomes 
were listed, specifically from those who were just asked to deliberate. Thus, it appears 
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when people are asked to consider many potential outcomes of errors, and to think deeply 
on those errors, they consider more positive outcomes when working with those errors. 
Interestingly, more negative outcomes were listed by participants who were asked to 
forecast extensively about errors, however, fewer negative outcomes were listed by those 
asked to deliberate on those errors. Thus, when people are asked to consider multiple 
consequences of an error, they consider more negative outcomes as opposed to when they 
are asked to think deeply on those errors. Taken as a whole, it appears deliberating on 
errors leads to consideration of more positive, but less negative outcomes. Forecasting 
extensively on those errors, however, leads to more negative outcomes, unless also asked 
to think deeply about those errors.  
 The level of specificity, or how general vs specific one is when working with 
errors, was impacted by forecasting timeframe and extensiveness. Specifically, those 
asked to consider more long-term consequences were more specific in their forecasts and 
deliberations about errors. Likewise, those asked to consider any and all possible 
outcomes were more specific when working with errors. Thus, it appears forecasting 
about errors leads people to be more specific, considering long term consequences and 
outcomes of greater detail, when working with errors. Along similar lines, results for the 
quality of forecasts and deliberations on errors was impacted by forecasting timeframe 
and forecasting extensiveness. Those who considered more long-term forecasts, and 
forecasted more extensively, produced higher quality responses when working with 
errors.  
 Given the evidence thus far, it appears our manipulations have effects on the way 
people work with errors. The next question, however, is how might the way people work 
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with errors differentially impact subsequent creative problem solutions? First, not only 
was the number of errors identified positively correlated with creativity, but analysis of 
covariance test results showed people produced plans of greater quality, originality, and 
elegance when they identified more errors, even when considering knowledge, divergent 
thinking, and intelligence.  
 Our fifth and sixth hypotheses were supported in that the number of negative 
outcomes and positive outcomes listed contributed to plans of greater quality, originality, 
and elegance, even considering knowledge, intelligence, and divergent thinking. Thus, 
when people work with errors and list more negative and positive outcomes, they produce 
more creative plans. Our seventh hypothesis was supported given when participants were 
more specific in their forecasts and deliberations on errors, they produced plans of higher 
quality, originality, and elegance. Findings are the same for when people provided higher 
quality forecasts and deliberations, supporting our eighth hypothesis. Thus, when people 
are more specific and provide better quality forecasts and deliberations when working 
with errors, they, in turn, produce more creative problem solutions.   
 In conclusion, forecasting timeframe, forecasting extensiveness, and deliberation 
on errors do not seem to contribute to creative problem solutions when considering 
knowledge, intelligence, and divergent thinking. That said, they do contribute to how 
people work with errors on a creative problem task, in that people list more positive and 
negative outcomes, and are more specific, providing higher quality forecasts and 
deliberations when thinking about errors they’ve identified.  And, when people are better 
at working with errors through listing more positive and negative outcomes, providing 
more detailed and higher quality forecasts and deliberations, they produce higher quality, 
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more original, and more elegant creative problem solutions. Thus, people can consider 
more short or long term, more extensive outcomes of errors, and deliberate on errors, but 
creativity will not benefit simply by forecasting or deliberating on errors - what is critical 
to creative performance is how people work with those errors. Forecasting more 
extensively, more long-term, and deliberating on errors seems to make people better at 
working with errors, and when people are better at working with errors, they produce 
higher quality, more original, and more elegant problem solutions.  
 Errors will occur in the creative thinking process (Mumford et al., 1991), and 
there is evidence that people make errors when engaging in creative tasks (Licuanan et 
al., 2007; Ward et al., 2004; Mumford et al., 1996). More research is needed on how 
people identify and work with errors in creative problem-solving, especially as it pertains 
to deliberating on errors and forecasting about those errors. These findings have 
implications for error management training (Keith & Frese, 2005, 2008; Robledo et al., 
2012) in creative efforts, in that the focus of training should be on how people identify 
and work with errors. As people are trained on identifying and working with errors, they 
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Table 1.                 
Correlations for creativity and covariates                     
  
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Quality 2.53 0.85 1 
             
2. Originality 1.96 0.73 .747** 1 
            
3. Elegance 2.62 0.81 .929** .762** 1 
           
4. Intelligence 6.79 7.57. .333** .189** .295** 1 
          
5. Divergent Think 6.12 2.4 .228** .252** .218** .092 1 
         
6. Knowledge Test 3.84 1.16 .314** .283** .318** .334** .258** 1 
        
7. Planning 8.97 1.9 .181** .060 .180** .189** -.040 .250** 1 
       
8. Need for Cog 3.13 0.59 .164* .092 .169* .209** .203** .245** .216** 1 
      
9. Marketing Exp 14.4 4.5 -.028 .075 -.015 -.219
** .082 .010 -.158* .060 1 
     
10. Neur 3.24 0.66 -.037 -.116 -.047 .021 -.095 -.002 -.014 -.195
** -.012 1 
    
11. Extra 3.55 0.66 -.055 .013 -.037 -.216
** .093 -.066 -.098 .107 .139* -.162* 1 
   
12. Open 3.21 0.52 .067 -.011 .057 .199** .088 .224** .212** .519** -.021 -.058 .108 1 
  
13. Agree 3.53 0.53 -.035 -.069 .017 .011 .016 .126 .133* .044 -.032 -.051 .301** .174** 1 
 
14. Consc 3.62 0.58 .077 .019 .116 -.016 .043 .076 .053 .256** .042 -.333
** .292** .090 .264** 1 
Note: ** sig. at .01 level 
            
* sig. at .05 level 







Table 2.                     
Correlations for creativity and rated scenario variables               
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Quality 2.53 0.85 1               
2. Originality 1.96 0.73 .747** 1             
3. Elegance 2.62 0.81 .929** .762** 1           
4. Number of Errors ID 1.5 0.74 .435** .363** .416** 1         
5. Number of Positive Outcomes 0.29 0.27 .240** .232** .234** .248** 1       
6. Number of Negative Outcomes 1.23 0.66 .297** .249** .304** .658** -0.083 1     
7. Specificity 2.35 0.61 .520** .424** .502** .651** .493** .559** 1   
8. Quality (Scenario) 2.26 0.61 .533** .438** .519** .691** .477** .630** .975** 1 
Note: ** sig. at .01 level                     






Table 3.       
ANCOVA Results for manipulations on quality, originality, and elegance 
 
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Quality       
Knowledge Test 7.21 1 7.21 11.60 0.00** 0.05 
Intelligence 9.75 1 9.75 15.68 0.00** 0.07 
Timeframe 0.91 2 0.45 0.73 0.48 0.01 
Extensiveness 0.10 1 0.10 0.16 0.69 0.00 
Deliberation 0.22 1 0.22 0.35 0.55 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.46 1 0.46 0.74 0.39 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.13 1 0.13 0.21 0.65 0.00 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 1.32 
 
1.32 2.13 0.15 0.01 
Originality 
      
Knowledge Test 5.19 1 5.19 10.62 0.00** 0.05 
Divergent Thinking 3.74 1 3.74 7.66 0.01** 0.03 
Timeframe 0.20 2 0.10 0.21 0.81 0.00 
Extensiveness 0.36 1 0.36 0.74 0.39 0.00 
Deliberation 0.07 1 0.07 0.14 0.71 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.07 1 0.07 0.14 0.71 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 0.84 0.00 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.16 1 0.16 0.33 0.56 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.08 1 0.08 0.15 0.70 0.00 
Elegance 
      
Knowledge Test 7.58 1 7.58 13.11 0.00** 0.06 
Intelligence 5.95 1 5.95 10.29 0.00** 0.05 
Timeframe 0.68 2 0.34 0.59 0.56 0.01 
Extensiveness 0.36 1 0.36 0.62 0.43 0.00 
Deliberation 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 0.85 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.34 1 0.34 0.59 0.44 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.62 1 0.62 1.08 0.30 0.01 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.02 1 0.02 0.03 0.85 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.79 1 0.79 1.37 0.24 0.01 







Table 4.       
ANCOVA Results for manipulations on rated scenario variable 
Source SS df MS F Sig. ηp2 
Number of Errors Identified       
Knowledge Test 3.88 1 3.88 8.11 0.00** 0.04 
Divergent Thinking 5.77 1 5.77 12.06 0.00** 0.05 
Openness 2.21 1 2.21 4.62 0.03* 0.02 
Timeframe 0.38 2 0.19 0.40 0.67 0.00 
Extensiveness 1.31 1 1.31 2.74 0.10 0.01 
Deliberation 0.11 1 0.11 0.22 0.64 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.22 1 0.22 0.45 0.50 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.17 1 0.17 0.36 0.55 0.00 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.55 1 0.55 1.15 0.29 0.01 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.04 1 0.04 0.09 0.77 0.00 
Number of Positive Outcomes 
      
Extra 0.17 1 0.17 3.06 0.08 0.02 
Timeframe 0.03 1 0.03 0.48 0.49 0.00 
Extensiveness 0.01 1 0.01 0.21 0.65 0.00 
Deliberation 2.69 1 2.69 48.20 0.00** 0.20 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.02 1 0.02 0.43 0.52 0.00 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 1.19 1 1.19 21.37 0.00** 0.10 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.13 1 0.13 2.26 0.13 0.01 
Number of Negative Outcomes       
Divergent Thinking 4.03 1 4.03 12.20 0.00** 0.06 
Timeframe 0.20 1 0.20 0.61 0.44 0.00 
Extensiveness 3.06 1 3.06 9.29 0.00** 0.05 
Deliberation 16.22 1 16.22 49.16 0.00** 0.20 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.91 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.10 1 0.10 0.30 0.58 0.00 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.26 1 0.26 0.80 0.37 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.11 1 0.11 0.32 0.57 0.00 
Specificity       
Knowledge Test 4.97 1 4.97 15.71 0.00** 0.08 
Divergent Thinking 2.19 1 2.19 6.94 0.01** 0.04 
Timeframe 1.53 1 1.53 4.84 0.03* 0.02 
Extensiveness 1.28 1 1.28 4.04 0.05* 0.02 
Deliberation 0.30 1 0.30 0.94 0.33 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.36 1 0.36 1.15 0.28 0.01 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.50 1 0.50 1.58 0.21 0.01 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 1.52 1 1.52 4.80 0.03* 0.02 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.88 0.00 
Note: ** indicates sig. at .01 level, * sig. at .05 level 
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Table 4. 
      
Source SS df MS F Sig. ηp2 
Quality (Scenario)             
Knowledge Test 6.64 1 6.64 21.38 0.00** 0.10 
Divergent Thinking 2.16 1 2.16 6.96 0.01** 0.04 
Timeframe 1.18 1 1.18 3.80 0.05* 0.02 
Extensiveness 1.44 1 1.44 4.63 0.03* 0.02 
Deliberation 0.09 1 0.09 0.28 0.60 0.00 
Timeframe * Extensiveness 0.22 1 0.22 0.70 0.40 0.00 
Timeframe * Deliberation 0.47 1 0.47 1.50 0.22 0.01 
Extensiveness * Deliberation 1.37 1 1.37 4.41 0.04* 0.02 
Timeframe * Extensiveness * Deliberation 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 



















Table 5.       
ANCOVA results for rated scenario variables on quality, originality, and elegance 
Source SS df MS F Sig. ηp
2 
Quality 
      
Knowledge Test 2.43 1 2.43 4.12 0.04* 0.02 
Intelligence 8.17 1 8.17 13.84 0.00** 0.07 
Number of Errors ID 8.11 1 8.11 13.73 0.00** 0.07 
Knowledge Test 4.79 1 4.79 7.77 0.01** 0.04 
Intelligence 8.86 1 8.86 14.38 0.00** 0.07 
Number of Positive Outcomes 3.10 1 3.10 5.04 0.03* 0.03 
Knowledge Test 3.93 1 3.93 6.53 0.01** 0.03 
Intelligence 7.44 1 7.44 12.34 0.00** 0.06 
Number of Negative Outcomes 5.75 1 5.75 9.54 0.00** 0.05 
Knowledge Test 3.27 1 3.27 5.66 0.02* 0.03 
Intelligence 6.99 1 6.99 12.09 0.00** 0.06 
Specificity 10.61 1 10.61 18.37 0.00** 0.09 
Knowledge Test 2.38 1 2.38 4.20 0.04* 0.02 
Intelligence 6.79 1 6.79 12.00 0.00** 0.06 
Quality (Scenario) 12.90 1 12.90 22.78 0.00** 0.10 
Originality       
Knowledge Test 3.20 1 3.20 6.82 0.01* 0.03 
Divergent_Thinking 1.97 1 1.97 4.21 0.04** 0.02 
Number of Errors ID 2.97 1 2.97 6.33 0.01* 0.03 
Knowledge Test 4.59 1 4.59 9.71 0.00** 0.05 
Intelligence 3.09 1 3.09 6.53 0.01** 0.03 
Number of Positive Outcomes 2.11 1 2.11 4.46 0.04* 0.02 
Knowledge Test 3.71 1 3.71 7.94 0.01** 0.04 
Intelligence 2.96 1 2.96 6.33 0.01** 0.03 
Number of Negative Outcomes 3.25 1 3.25 6.96 0.01** 0.03 
Knowledge Test 3.58 1 3.58 7.70 0.01** 0.04 
Intelligence 2.42 1 2.42 5.21 0.02* 0.03 
Specificity 3.76 1 3.76 8.09 0.00** 0.04 
Knowledge Test 2.63 1 2.63 5.85 0.02* 0.03 
Intelligence 2.17 1 2.17 4.82 0.03* 0.02 
Quality (Scenario) 6.72 1 6.72 14.95 0.00** 0.07 







Table 5.       
Source SS df MS F Sig. ηp
2 
Elegance       
Knowledge Test 2.89 1 2.89 5.24 0.02* 0.03 
Divergent_Thinking 5.75 1 5.75 10.42 0.00** 0.05 
Number of Errors ID 6.72 1 6.72 12.18 0.00** 0.06 
Knowledge Test 5.17 1 5.17 9.06 0.00** 0.04 
Intelligence 6.26 1 6.26 10.97 0.00** 0.05 
Number of Positive Outcomes 3.11 1 3.11 5.45 0.02* 0.03 
Knowledge Test 4.26 1 4.26 7.66 0.01** 0.04 
Intelligence 5.07 1 5.07 9.11 0.00** 0.04 
Number of Negative Outcomes 5.96 1 5.96 10.72 0.00** 0.05 
Knowledge Test 3.83 1 3.83 7.01 0.01** 0.03 
Intelligence 4.94 1 4.94 9.03 0.00** 0.04 
Specificity 7.76 1 7.76 14.19 0.00** 0.07 
Knowledge Test 2.78 1 2.78 5.26 0.02* 0.03 
Intelligence 4.65 1 4.65 8.81 0.00** 0.04 
Quality (Scenario) 11.46 1 11.46 21.71 0.00** 0.10 









Figure 1. Charamousse market research summary 
 
 






Figure 3. Example scenarios with and without errors  
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Figure 4. Example benchmark rating scale 
 
 
 
 
